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ABSTRACT
Simulation methodology has been used to analyse the effectiveness of multi-barrel rocket
launcher system (MBRLs) delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs) on armour force
deployed in concentration areas under various terrain conditions. The methodology considers
various aiming strategies, the effectiveness of the sensor and the imprecision in information
available about the target to evaluate the effectiveness of the MBRL system.
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1 . INTRODUCTION
With the advancements in technology, nations
are building precision conventional strike (PCS)
weapons which can attack selected targets with
high accuracy and limited collateral damage. PCS
is achieved by a variety of weapon systems collectively
known as precision-guided munitions (PGMs). PCS
can encompass targets at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war and can be conducted
by force elements fielded by all the three Armed
Services. Though it has been typically associated
with deep attack, the association is not a necessary
condition. Due to the PCS, future battlefield is
becoming increasingly dynamic and nonlinear in
nature, resulting in partitioning of the battle space
into indistinct deep, close, and rear areas1-3.
With the reach of artillery increasing up to 70-
100 km and the induction of multi-barrel rocket
launchers (MBRLs), capable of delivering large
amount of explosives in short time span, artillery
can now engage enemy deep inside its territory.
That way, it can degrade its confidence even before
the enemy is able to launch its attack.
A methodology for analysis of the effectiveness
of PGMs delivered by MBRLs against armour
force concentration has been discussed. As a case
study, an example where two batteries of MBRL
delivering PGMs to attack an armour force of one
Brigade (180 tanks), in various operational modes,
has been discussed. A simulation exercise has been
carried out to evaluate the casualties suffered by
the armour systems under attack by PGMs. The
model also incorporates the inaccuracy in information
about target in terms of geo location error. The
effect of environment on the flight path of PGMs
has been considered in the form of drift velocity.
2 . PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS IN
ANTI-ARMOUR ROLE
In the modern day war, armour systems play
a very decisive role in shaping the course of war
in the battlefield, thus a large number of programmes
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for building PGMs for destroying armour are in
existence in the world2-4. Some of these are low-
cost anti-armour sub-munition (LOCAAS, USA),
Army Tactical Missile System Block II/III or BOAR
(ATCAMS, USA), Sensorfuzed Munitions (SMArt,
Germany), BONUS smart 155 mm Artillery Round
(Sweden, France), SPLAV 9A52 SMERCH with
9M55K1 warhead (Russia), etc.
The PGMs are delivered either by rockets or
missiles. The PGMs are stored in its bus section
which separates from the rocket at an appropriate
altitude above the target area (Fig. 1). A non-contact
target sensor monitors the descent altitude of the
PGMs. It causes the (parachute-retarded, top-attack)
containing five MOTIF-3M sub-munitions. These
warheads form fragments which attack the tanks
from the top.
In the above outlined process of operation of
PGMs, following issues need to be modelled for
analysis:
• Flight path or trajectory of the rocket
• The point of dispensing the PGMs by the rocket
over the target area
• The spiral motion and descent of the PGMs
retarded by the parachute
• The sensing system of the warhead and point
of activation of fragmentation
The rockets or missiles will follow a certain
trajectory and arrive in the target area. Here, it
senses the targets by its sensors or is pre-programmed
to release the PGMs after certain flight path/duration.
This model considers that the pattern in which the
rockets fired from the MBRLs reach the aim point,
follows a circular normal distribution with mean
co-incident with the aim point (A
x
,Ay) and standard
deviation σ, derived as a function of circular error
probable (CEP). Thus, the dispensing point I
x
, Iy
wrt rocket are given by
I
x 
= R
x
σ + A
x
Iy = Ryσ + Ay
where R
x
, Ry are standard normal random numbers.
Each dispenser releases n number of PGMs,
equipped with a parachute. The sub-munitions are
dispensed in a direction ω (taken randomly from
18 directions or 20o angular sectors) around the
flight path of the rocket. The PGMs are released
at fixed intervals of distances (say d) along the
flight path. Therefore, the release point of each
sub-munition can be calculated as
Di
x 
= I
x 
+ d* i* cos (α)
Diy = Iy + d* i* sin (α)  for i = 1…..n
where Di is the precise point of release and
α = 20 ω is the angle of release.
sub-munitions to be dispensed at an optimum height
for target acquisition by their integral sensors. On
target detection, it activates the kinetic energy, self-
forging, fragment warhead which defeats the target.
3 . METHODOLOGY
For the purpose of illustration of the analysis
methodology, an armoured Brigade (135 tanks +
45 supporting AFVs) is considered to be under
attack by 2 Batteries of SPLAV 9A52 SMERCH
multiple-launch rocket system. Each Battery consists
of 6 launchers each carrying 12 tubes. Each tube
fires one rocket. Each rocket has 9M55K1 warheads
Figure 1. Precision-guided munitions in anti-armour role.
283
GUPTA, et al.: EFFECTIVENESS OF PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS ON ARMOUR SYSTEMS
Each PGM is under influence of three forces
at the time of release, firstly the forward motion
of the rocket along its flight path, secondly, the
resistance offered by parachute in the prevailing
wind conditions; and thirdly, the gravitational pull.
Consequently, it can be considered that each sub-
munition describes an inward Archimedean spiral
(r = θ). The spiral motion starts from the release
point with initial radius r1 and initial angle θ = 20pi
which is assumed to reduce by 2pi every second.
The actual values 20pi and 2pi will depend on the
specific system under study and have been assumed
this way for analysis. Therefore, the radius r at
any point of time in the spiral is given by
r = r1* θ/20pi
where θ is the refreshed value of the angle after
initiation of descent.
The initial height (Z) at which the sensor starts
its search over the spiral path also reduces by a
descent rate ZR. The new height of the sensor at
any given time is given by Z = Z–[ZR* (20pi–θ)/2pi].
The Cartesian coordinates X and Y are calculated
from the polar coordinates r, θ and environment
factors incorporated in the drift velocities by
X = r* cos(θ) + D
x
Y = r* sin(θ) + Dy
where D
x 
and Dy are the drift components of the
drift velocity.
At each point (X,Y,Z) travelled by the PGM
in space, the sensor searches the ground with a
circle of radius NR given by
NR = Z/tan(pi/2 - φ /2)
where φ is the lookdown angle of the sensor
(Fig. 2).
One of the major factors in activation of warhead
fragmentation is the time of attack. Probability of
detection by the infrared detector of the PGMs
depends upon how hot the tank is in the concentration
area. The tank heat depends upon the duration td
(in hours) after it's engine is stopped. Therefore,
if the attack is immediately after tank move, it has
better chances of success than the attack after
long duration of assembly in the concentration area.
The detection probability by the sensor can be
evaluated as a function of td (Fig. 3) using the
relation
Pd = exp (−λ td) for td ≤ 12
where parameter λ is related to terrain. In plains,
vegetation and built up areas affect the detection
probability as compared to deserts. The detection
probability fades and becomes nearly constant after
12 h.
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Figure 2. Sensor moving in spiral trajectory.
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A tank is detected if the tank lies in the circle
described by the sensor of radius NR, i.e.,
√{(T
x 
- X)2 + (Ty - Y)2} ≤ NR
where T
x
, Ty are the tank coordinates.
Once a tank is detected by the sensor of the
PGM, it activates the warhead to generate fragments
for top attack on the target. A tank is killed if
R1 < Pd , R2 < Phit, and R3 < PKill
where R1, R2 and R3 are random numbers from
uniform population.
4 . CASE STUDY
As metioned earlier, this study considers an
armoured Brigade (135 tanks + 45 supporting AFVs)
under attack by 2 Batteries of SPLAV 9A52 SMERCH
multiple-launch rocket system. Each Battery consists
of 6 launchers each carrying 12 tubes. Each tube
fires one rocket. Each rocket has 9M55K1 warheads
containing 5 MOTIF-3M sub-munitions. Hence, a
total of 2 x 6 x 12 = 144 rockets containing
144 x 5 = 720 sub-munitions are fired on the Brigade.
The rocket acts as a dispensing unit which dispenses
these sub-munitions at an optimum height over the
target area (170-150 m). Following ejection, trajectory
of each sub-munition is stabilised by a parachute.
The sub-munition descends by a parachute at a
speed of 15-17 m/s and detects targets by means
of two-colour infrared sensor with 30o field of view.
The purpose of this study is to illustrate the
utility of the model in analysing multiple issues
namely
• Deployment strategies for tanks
• Optimum aiming strategies
• Difference in performance due to terrain
• Effect of geo-location errors in aiming, consequent
tank casualties, and permissible allowances
regarding precise target locations, while firing
such munitions
Other input regarding the munitions and target
considered in the study are enumerated.
4.1 Input Parameters of the PGM
Rocket range = 20 to 70 km
Rocket weight = 800 kg
System error
Probable error in accuracy = 0.35 – 0.45 per
cent of range
Probable error in consistency = 0.20 – 0.25
per cent of range
Figure 3. Detection probability of tank after its engine stopped.
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Area coverage
12 Rockets 650 m x 650 m at 40 km
800 m x 800 m at 70 km
Kill probability = 70 per cent
Clustered homing sub-munition 9M55k1: 5 sub-
munitions are ejected at 150 m and stabilised at
150 m. It self destructs after 45 s.
4.2 Parameters of the Target (Armoured
Brigade Deployment)
Armoured Brigade deployment in concentration
area of 9 km x 9 km has been considered for the
following two scenarios, i.e.,
• Plains where line of sight available is up to 500 m
and hence inter-tank distance (ITD) of 300 m,
400 m and 500 m have been considered
• Desert where line of sight up to 800 m is
available, and hence inter tank distance can
vary from 300 m to 800 m. However, results
relating to 300 m, 400 m, and 500 m have only
been analysed to present a comparative picture
in performance over the two terrain conditions.
4.3 Aim Points on the Target
While conducting the simulation, multiple aim-
point approach has been considered. Each launcher
fires on respective aim points generating a better
target coverage. The various strategies analysed
in the study are:
• Aim point at Regiment centres each engaged
by 3 launchers each
• Aim point at Squadron centre each engaged by
1 launcher
• Triangulated aim point over concentration area,
each point engaged by 1 launcher (Fig. 4)
5 . RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Three sets of results, tank casualties in plains
(Fig. 5) and deserts (Fig. 6) with different aiming
strategies and a set of tank casualties with different
geo-location errors (Fig. 7) have been generated.
Figures 5 and 6 indicate that aiming at Squadron 
centres gives best possible performance in different
situations.
The analysis shows that by increasing the inter-
tank distances within the fixed concentration areas
Figure 4. Triangulated aim point strategy. 
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Figure 5. Inter-tank distances versus tank casualties
engagement range = 40 km.
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the casualties can be reduced. The penalty in increasing
the inter-tank distance is loss of command and
control. The results in case of  firing on Regimental
centres show some bit of awkwardness (tank-to-
tank distance: 400 m) mainly because in other aiming
strategies, aim points are better spread over the
target area, generating better area coverage.
Another important issue in PGM firing is the
availability of target coordinates. In Fig. 7, it has
been observed that even with 10 per cent error in
the information about the target, the PGMs have
been able to inflict sizeable casualties. However,
quantitatively, the casualties reduce to about 60
per cent in deserts, and 40 per cent in plains, while
Figure 6. Inter-tank distances versus tank casualties
engagement range = 70 km
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moving from ideal conditions (zero error) to 10 per
cent error. The further drop is much sharper. Therefore,
10 per cent geo-location error can be considered
as a permissible allowance in aiming.
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